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For public employees throughout the United States, the protection
of the First Amendment is restricted and inadequately enforced.' While
the citizenry is entitled to engage in wide-open debate,2 public em-
ployees must confine their speech within narrower bounds.3 Even when
their speech is nominally protected, public employees are vulnerable
to covert sanctions.4 If an employee is removed for exercising his First
Amendment rights and sues for reinstatement, 5 the employer can de-
feat the action by showing that he would have removed the employee
1. This Note examines only the First Amendment rights of public employees because
private employees do not hold First Amendment rights against their employers unless
there is state action. See Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 288-89 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (finding state action in dismissal of employee for exercising
First Amendment rights because of "symbiotic relationship" between government and
private employer). State and federal employees do hold First Amendment rights against
their employers. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 270 (1964).
3. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (establishing special balancing
test for employees' speech); see pp. 381-82 and note 45 infra (discussing Pickering test); cf.
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979) (employee's
private expression may "bring additional factors to the Pickering calculus"). But see
Pilkington v. Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465, 478-79 n.11 (D.R.I. 1977), afi'd, 590 F.2d 386
(Ist Cir. 1979) (suggesting employee's right qua employee "to participate and express his
opinions in his place of work without fear of reprisal").
Public-employee free speech issues commonly arise in the context of public elementary
and secondary schools. The tension over teachers' expression is great because the schools
are considered both marketplaces of ideas, see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969), and places in which teachers shape "the
attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live," Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968) (surveying legal protection of students' and teachers'
rights).
4. The absence of open procedures for reaching personnel decisions makes it difficult
to ascertain the motivation behind such decisions. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d
701, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Supreme Court has recognized that "the threat of dismissal
from public employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech." Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). See generally K. DAvis, DIscRETIONARY JUsric 111-16
(1969) (discussing openness as protection against arbitrariness).
5. Since the elimination of the amount in controversy requirement in suits against the
United States, such suits may be brought against federal employers under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a) (1976). See Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 771 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979). Such suits
may be brought against state employers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Equitable relief is
sought because in most cases state officers will be shielded by personal immunity from
damage actions when acting in good faith within their authority. McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part
1, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 59 (1974). Reinstatement remedies depart from the old notion that
equity will enforce employment contracts only negatively and not specifically. Id. at 60;
see J. POMEROY & J. MCMANN, SPECIFic PERFORMANCE OF CONTAarS 75-76 (3d ed. 1926).
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even had the employee not engaged in the protected activity. 6 The
employee can prevail only if the court finds that, but for the pro-
tected activity, the employee would not have been removed.7 This
combination of substantive limitations, covert sanctions, and adminis-
trative unaccountability effectively stifles public employees. 8
This Note argues that covert abridgments of protected speech
should be attacked by changing the standard of proof in reinstatement
suits.9 Only a replacement of the current but-for test with one that
asks whether protected activity was simply a substantial cause of the
decision to remove the employee can lead to greater administrative
accountability. After describing the procedural rights and First Amend-
ment rights of public employees, the Note examines the defects of the
but-for test. The Note then proposes and justifies the alternative
substantial-cause test.10
I. The Rights of Public Employees
Although the constitutional rights of public employees have ex-
panded over the last thirty years," courts remain deferential to per-
6. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1979); Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see pp. 383-84 infra.
7. Although the Supreme Court adopted this rule in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), it first described the test in terms of "but-for"
causation in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979).
8. See Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 450 n.13 (1977) (Mt. Healthy test char-
acterized as "Catch 22" and "confession and avoidance").
9. The appropriateness of current substantive limitations on employee speech is beyond
the scope of this Note. Compare Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-72 (1968)
(establishing limits on employee speech) with Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (rejecting any distinction between citizen's and public
employee's speech rights).
10. Although this Note focuses on removals that involve the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights, the Mt. Healthy test, see pp. 383-84 infra, applying a but-for standard, also
has been applied to removals or refusals to hire for other impermissible reasons, see, e.g.,
East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977) (job applicants'
Title VII claim of racial discrimination); NLRB v. Eastern Smelting and Refining Corp.,
598 F.2d 666, 671 (1st Cir. 1979) (test of discriminatory discharge under National Labor
Relations Act). The test also has been invoked in contexts other than government employ-
ment. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 270-71 n.21 (1977) (racially discriminatory zoning); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46,
64 (2d Cir. 1978) (denial of Medicaid benefits); Comment, Proof of Racially Discriminatory
Purpose under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt.
Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 725, 745-52 (1977) (Mt. Healthy
indicates "strict scrutiny" will not be applied to mixed motives decisions).
11. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the premise it found embodied in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S.
485 (1952), namely, that public employment "may be conditioned upon the surrender of
constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government action." 385 U.S.
at 605.
For many years, the prevailing philosophy was that expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in
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sonnel decisions of local administrators.12 Such deference to discre-
tionary administrative procedures undermines the First Amendment
rights of public employees.
A. Procedural Rights
Public employees who are removed from jobs have a minimum of
procedural rights. An administrative hearing is required under the due
process clause only if the removal implicates the employee's property
or liberty interests. 13 A nontenured or probationary public employee
is not entitled to a statement of reasons for his removal; 14 he may be
removed for any reason but an unconstitutional one-or for no reason
at all.15
An employee's property interest is derived from existing rules or
understandings that stem from a source outside the Constitution, such
as statutes or regulations.' 6 Although the Supreme Court has not
settled whether the entitlement may limit its procedural concomitants,'
7
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892):
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no con-
stitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which
the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well
as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain,
as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.
Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18.
The case that marked the beginning of the Supreme Court's more protective attitude
toward public employees' First Amendment rights was decided shortly after Adler-
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (refusing to enjoin payment to employees who
had not subscribed to loyalty oath). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968) (reviewing
Supreme Court techniques for avoiding harsh consequences of characterizing government
benefit as "privilege").
12. Note, A Constitutional Interest in Public Employment: The Last Hurrah?-Bishop
v. Wood, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 631, 649 (1977).
13. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976) (policeman's termination implicated neither property nor liberty interest).
14. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); see Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1961) (absent statutory limita-
tion, government employer has broad latitude to hire and fire).
15. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 (1977)
(nontenured employee may be discharged "for no reason whatever").
16. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
17. In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the three-justice plurality stated that
the property interest was conditioned by "procedural limitations which had accompanied
the grant of that interest." Id. at 155 (Rehnquist, Stevens, JJ., & Burger, C.J.). The other
six justices expressly rejected that view. Id. at 166-67 (Powell, Blackmun, JJ., concurring);
id. at 177-78 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 211 (Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, JJ., dissent-
ing). In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the five-justice majority held that under
the law of the state a "permanent" employee did not have a property right and could
therefore be constitutionally removed at will. Id. at 345 & n.8. The four dissenters claimed
that the Bishop majority had thereby adopted the "bitter with the sweet" position ad-
vocated by the plurality in Arnett. Id. at 357-61.
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it has made clear that rudimentary procedures will usually satisfy an
employee's hearing rights.'
Removal of an employee for derogatory or stigmatizing reasons that
he alleges are false implicates his liberty interests and entitles him to
an administrative hearing to clear his name.19 Yet the fact of nonre-
tention2" and the communication to an employee of an erroneous
reason for his removal 21 have been held not to infringe liberty in-
terests. The Court has held that the Constitution does not provide
federal judicial review as a protection against administrative errors.22
B. First Amendment Rights
Public employees who criticize either the specific institution with
which they are associated 23 or the government more generally24 are
vulnerable to employment reprisals. Such criticism may annoy or
threaten an employee's superiors, leading to reprisals that can range
from refusal to hire25 to outright dismissal, 26 including such interme-
diate steps as suspension, 27 nonrenewal, 28 transfer, 29 and the denial of
18. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155-56 n.21 (1974) (supervisor who charged
employee with slandering him may rule on employee's termination).
19. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1972).
20. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976) (discharge of employee whose position
was "terminable at the will of the employer"); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
575 (1972) (nonrenewal of untenured professor).
21. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 & n.13 (1976) (providing mistaken reason or
deliberate lie does not infringe protected liberty interest).
22. Id. at 349-50 (accepting "harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are in-
evitable in the day-to-day administration of our affairs").
23. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 690 (D.D.C. 1974) (employee
testified before congressional committee on $2-billion cost overrun on aircraft project).
See generally CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, WHIsTLE BLOWING (R. Nader,
P. Petkas, & K. Blackwell eds. 1972) (examples of such criticism brought by government
and corporate employees) [hereinafter cited as WIsTL BLOWING].
24. See, e.g., Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485, 487 (2d Cir. 1973)
(professor sent letter to fellow faculty members inviting them to Vietnam war protest).
25. See, e.g., Franklin v. Atkins, 562 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
994 (1978) (professor).
26. See, e.g., Choudhry v. Jenkins, 559 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997
(1977) (probationary correctional officer); Shaw v. Board of Trustees, 549 F.2d 929 (4th
Cir. 1976) (one tenured professor, one professor under continuing appointment).
27. See, e.g., Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979) (30-day suspension of
federally employed clerk); Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (15-day suspension of police lieutenant).
28. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (assistant professor); Ofsevit
v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and Colleges, 21 Cal. 3d 763, 582 P.2d 88, 148 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1978) (en banc) (university lecturer).
29. See, e.g., Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
3101 (1979) (policeman transferred to city jail); Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d
114 (1st Cir. 1977) (social worker transferred to position with same rating but less prestige
and responsibility and more commuting time).
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promotion 0 or tenure.3 1 At times the employer may remove the em-
ployee explicitly on the ground that the employee's criticism impairs
the efficiency of the public service.32 More commonly, reprisals will be
covert: the employee will be removed allegedly on other grounds, stated
or unstated.33 Usually these other grounds actually exist, but it will
be unclear whether the employer would have acted on them had the
employee not spoken out.
34
Public employee speech implicates First Amendment values not be-
cause it tests the outer substantive limits of protected speech 35 but be-
cause it tests the nature of the protection afforded First Amendment
rights.36 In contrast to speech that has provoked such dramatic and
explicit sanctions as prior restraint3 7 and criminal prosecution, speech
by public employees tests judicial willingness to ferret out covert
abridgments of common political speech. 39 Such protection is im-
30. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 462 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (fireman); DeLuca
v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1977) (policemen).
31. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(school teacher); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976) (university pro-
fessor).
32. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing that public
employees' speech can impair efficient government services).
33. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that "actual
grounds for dismissal . . . may not be readily ascertainable, and almost always are
vigorously contested by the litigants").
34. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977)
(distinguishing fact that employer "could have" removed employee from question of
whether it "would have" removed him).
35. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1131-33 (1979)
(examining advocacy of genocide).
36. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (threat of dismissal from
public employment a potent means of inhibiting speech).
37. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (vacating in-
junction prohibiting publication of Pentagon Papers); United States v. The Progressive,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining publication of article on construction of
hydrogen bomb).
38. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (reversing conviction for incitement
during campus antiwar demonstration); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(reversing conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader for advocating violence at rally).
39. As Professor Emerson has noted, weaker procedural safeguards may make an ad-
ministrative system "a much tighter, more pervading form of restriction" than a criminal
system, and the low visibility of administrative decisions makes the "imagined impact of
the restriction . . . the most repressive feature of all." T. EMERSON, THE SYsrEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION 163 (1970).
Protection of the kind of speech involved in these cases would be unproblematic were
it not for the employment relationship. Typically it involves such conduct as informing
the news media of matters of local significance, see, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher wrote local newspaper criticizing school board's handling of
revenue proposals), communicating to superiors or fellow employees within the institu-
tion, see, e.g., Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (Ist Cir. 1977) (social worker
informed superiors of administrative irregularities in food stamp program), or advocating
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portant because it is in these innumerable, minor daily occasions of
political speech that freedom of speech flourishes in a society.40
The Supreme Court has granted qualified protection to speech by
public employees. In Pickering v. Board of Education,4' the Court
rejected the position that citizens may be compelled to relinquish First
Amendment rights in order to obtain public employment.42 Yet the
Court cautioned that "the State has interests as an employer in regulat-
ing the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general." 43 The employee's free speech interest must be balanced
the rights of others, typically minors, see, e.g., Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary School
Dist. No. 3, 548 F.2d 857, 859 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977) (school counsellor
advised parents of children placed in classes for mentally retarded to consult legal aid
society).
40. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (recognizing that teachers
are especially important members of the public with respect to school issues); A. BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62 (1975) (recognizing essential First Amendment interest in
"[d]iscussion, the exchange of views, the ventilation of desires and demands"); Walsu E
BLOWING, supra note 23, at 10 (noting importance of whistleblowers as internal check on
governmental behavior).
Congress recently provided federal employees with statutory protection against reprisals
for whistleblowing. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 2301(b)(9), 92
Stat. 1114 (1978) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 2301(b)(9) (West 1979)). The same act created a
Special Counsel with authority to preserve the anonymity of whistleblowers. Id. § 1206
(b)(1), 92 Stat. 1125 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 1206(b)(1) (West 1979)).
41. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
42. Id. at 568.
43. Id. The weight given the state interest in regulating its employees' First Amend-
ment rights varies with the nature of the job. Nonpolicymaking employees can be arrayed
on a spectrum, from university professors at one end to policemen at the other. State
inhibition of academic freedom is strongly disfavored. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In polar contrast is the discipline demanded
of, and freedom correspondingly denied to, policemen. See, e.g., Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568
F.2d 311, 321 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rosenn, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903
(1978) (police are "para-military force"); Kannisto v. City and County of San Francisco,
541 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (emphasizing police
department's interest in discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity).
Policymakers occupy a special position and may be dismissed without regard to the
First Amendment. See Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1976) (upholding
governor's removal of appointee for expressions made "in contravention of the policy
goals of the governor"); cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(differences between policymaking and nonpolicymaking government employees with
respect to patronage dismissals).
The speech rights of CIA employees are even more restricted than those of policy-
makers. Contractual provisions giving the CIA the right to restrain even former employees
from publishing information derived from classified sources have been upheld against
First Amendment challenges. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 932 (4th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3131 (US. Aug. 17, 1979) (No. 79-265) (agreement giving CIA
right to withhold consent to publication of classified information not in public domain,
not violative of First Amendment); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1370
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (CIA employee contractually relinquished First
Amendment rights with respect to classifiable information).
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against the state's interest in providing efficient public services. 44 In
determining whether the employee's speech is protected, courts are to
consider both the nature of the speech and the nature of the employ-
ment relation.
45
Although the Pickering calculus integrates the substantive rights of
employer and employee, the absence or rudimentary nature of pro-
cedural constraints on personnel decisions weakens the employee's sub-
stantive rights. Some covert or inadvertent abridgment of protected
speech is an inevitable cost of not imposing rigid procedural constraints
on administrative decisionmaking.4" That cost includes both the injury
suffered by the removed employee and the consequential chilling effect
on the exercise of First Amendment rights by other employees. The
cost can be minimized through judicial reinstatement of employees
removed, at least in substantial part, for exercising their First Amend-
ment rights. The current test for determining when an employee is
entitled to reinstatement fails to take into account the effect of a highly
44. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Mr. Justice Douglas has
questioned the uncritical use of the justification of efficiency for limiting employees'
rights. He suggests that many administrators may be more concerned with such internal
institutional values as a "pleasant manner, promotion of staff harmony, servility to the
cadre, and promptness, civility, and submissiveness" than with efficient performance.
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 205 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Though such in-
stitutional values might be justified as instrumental to the goal of efficient service, they
need not have that effect and may instead become ends in themselves. Hence, the very
foundation on which the constitutional limitation of public employees' rights rests may
be infirm.
45. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-73 (1968). The first consideration
involves the nature of the speech. The relevant factors include whether the speech is
defamatory or false; whether the speech relates to a matter of public interest; whether the
speech can be verified or refuted by the public record, or depends on the employee's
special access to information; and whether the forum involved is appropriate. Id.
The second consideration involves the actual or potential impact of the speech on the
employment relationship and on the efficiency of the public service. The relevant factors
include whether the speech was directed at someone with whom the speaker maintained
a close working relationship, such as an immediate superior; whether the speech might
disrupt discipline or harmony among coworkers; and whether the job is by its nature
especially sensitive to differences of opinion. Id. Given these factors, and their flexible
judicial application depending on the nature of the public employment involved, see
note 43 supra, the government may curtail employee conduct that genuinely threatens the
efficient operation of public agencies.
46. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court, in determining that a
particular administrative procedure was fair and reliable, pointed out that the medical
inquiry at issue was sharply focused and easily documented and did not involve critical
questions of witness credibility and veracity. Id. at 343-44. But removal of an employee
is typically not a sharply focused inquiry, is not easily documented, and turns importantly
on issues of witness credibility and veracity. Hence, errors are likely to be "numerous" in
the absence of procedural safeguards. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976).
Although the Court does not condone constitutionally illicit motives in the employment
context, the dearth of procedural safeguards in this context clearly increases the prob-
ability of their occurrence.
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discretionary administrative process on the already qualified First
Amendment rights of public employees; hence, it fails adequately to
vindicate those substantive rights.
II. Rejecting the Current But-For Test
In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,47
the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, propounded a but-for
test 48 for determining whether a public employee has been removed
improperly from his job and is therefore entitled to reinstatement.49
In Mt. Healthy, a school teacher was not rehired at least in substantial
part because he had informed a radio station that the school board had
urged the teachers to adopt a dress code. 0
The test developed by the Court in Mt. Healthy involves two steps.
First, a public employee who sues for reinstatement because of im-
proper removal must demonstrate that an impermissible ground was a
substantial or motivating factor in his removal.5' If the employee suc-
ceeds, then the burden shifts to the employer in the second step to
show that he would have removed the employee even had the employee
47.. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
48. In Mt. Healthy, the Court did not use the term "but for," but referred more
generally to a "rule of causation" and "a test of causation." Id. at 285-86. The Court first
used the phrase "but for" with respect to the test in Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979).
49. Prior to Mt. Healthy, lower courts differed as to the role impermissible motives
had to play in a removal decision in order to justify reinstatement. Compare Simard
v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (test is "motivated only in part" by
impermissible reasons) with Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 446 (D. Colo. 1976),
aff'd, 562 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 (1978) (test is whether
impermissible considerations were "paramount reason"). In Mt. Healthy itself, the District
Court had found for the employee on the ground that a "non-permissible reason did play
a substantial part" in the termination decision. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting lower court opinion).
50. The school superintendent informed the teacher that his contract had not been
renewed because of the teacher's "notable lack of tact in handling professional matters
which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing good school relationships."
429 U.S. at 283 n.l. The superintendent adduced two incidents as evidence: the teacher's
phone call to a local radio station informing it of a professional dress code that the
school board had suggested the teachers adopt, and the teacher's use of an obscene
gesture to correct students in the cafeteria. The District Court found that the phone call
was protected by the First Amendment and that it formed a substantial part of the school
board's decision not to renew; hence, it ordered the teacher reinstated. Id. at 284. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed. 529 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court accepted the
findings of the District Court but remanded the case with the instruction that the em-
ployer have the opportunity to show that regardless of the part played by the teacher's
First Amendment activity in its decision not to renew, the board would have removed
the employee even if he had not engaged in protected activity. 429 U.S. at 287.
51. 429 U.S. at 287.
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not engaged in the protected activity.52 The employee can prevail only
if the court finds that he would have been rehired but for the im-
permissible factor.
53
A. The Policies Underlying Mt. Healthy
The Mt. Healthy Court justified the but-for test in claims of im-
proper dismissal with a cursory analysis of the competing interests at
stake in public employment decisions. The Court contended that the
test was necessary to prevent plaintiff windfalls,"4 and buttressed that
justification by drawing an analogy to the removal of unconstitutional
taint in criminal proceedings.55
1. The Criminal Procedure Analogy
The Court drew support for the but-for test from criminal procedure
cases establishing that unconstitutional taint has a limited life. In those
cases, the Court had held that an unconstitutional governmental act
did not necessarily affect a subsequent event in the criminal process in
such a manner that conviction had to be overturned.
56 This analogy
52. Id. Variation in the standard of proof remains even among courts citing Mt.
Healthy. Compare Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977)
(plaintiff bears burden of showing that but for impermissible factors, she would have been
reemployed) and Tanner v. McCall, 441 F. Supp. 503, 513 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (plaintiffs must
show impermissible reason was "primary and dominant cause" of terminations) with
Ruhlman v. Hankinson, 461 F. Supp. 145, 150 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (jury properly instructed
to find for plaintiff if impermissible reason was "substantial factor" in removal). It is
unclear whether some courts have interpreted the Mt. Healthy "would-have" test as a
more pro-defendant "could-have" test. In Morris v. City of Kokomo, 381 N.E.2d 510
(Ind. App. 1978), the court held that defendants may escape liability if they "prove ...
that the decision to demote the plaintiffs was justified by reasons independent of the
constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 517. Mt. Healthy requires not merely that
justifying reasons exist ("could have") but that defendants show they would have acted
on such reasons absent plaintiff's First Amendment activity.
53. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979). In Givhan
the Court remanded the case because, "while the District Court found that petitioner's
'criticism' was the 'primary' reason for the School District's failure to rehire her, it did
not find that she would have been rehired but for her criticism." Id. (emphasis in
original).
54. 429 U.S. at 286 ("borderline or marginal [employee] .... ought not to be able, by
engaging in such [protected] conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his per-
formance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record").
55. Id. at 286-87.
56. Id. In criminal law, even a serious infringement of a defendant's constitutional
rights need not preclude conviction. If the government can show that the evidence on
which conviction rested was untainted by the government's unconstitutional acts, the
conviction will be upheld. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Mt.
Healthy cited three criminal cases: Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970)
(involuntariness of confession does not signify that subsequent guilty plea is involuntary);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (statement given several days after
unlawful arrest need not be found involuntary); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603
(1944) (coercion of initial confession does not preclude subsequent confession from being
voluntary).
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fails to recog-nize a crucial characteristic of the criminal procedure
cases: the presence of two discrete, actual events. For there to be a
proper analogy between Mt. Healthy and the criminal procedure deci-
sions, the latter would have had to suggest that a conviction based on
an unconstitutional event, such as a coerced confession, would be up-
held on a showing by the prosecution that it would have produced un-
tainted evidence had it not rested its case on the involuntary con-
fessionY7 Rather than applying such reasoning, the Court in those
cases held that the unconstitutional taint had been purged by the oc-
currence of a second event, such as a voluntary confession or a guilty
plea. Moreover, the defendant was the moving force in the second,
purgative event5s In the criminal cases, the Court validated the
criminal process only after the process had worked properly on the
second occasion. Mt. Healthy, however, allows the employer an op-
portunity to justify a decision post hoc and thus does not require that
the administrative process ever work properly.
2. The Danger of Plaintiff Windfalls
The Mt. Healthy Court also contended that the but-for test was
necessary to prevent plaintiff windfalls.59 Any weaker test for judging
the permissibility of employer action, the Court said, "could place an
employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitu-
tionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done
57. The proof required in Mt. Healthy contrasts sharply with that required to show
the absence of unconstitutional taint in the criminal cases relied upon by the Court. In
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Court held that once a defendant proved
that the government acquired evidence unlawfully and that "a substantial portion of the
case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree," the government must show that "its
proof had an independent origin." Id. at 341. Under Mt. Healthy, the employer need not
show that the removal had a basis independent of the employee's exercise of his speech
rights, but merely that a hypothetical decision would have had such an independent
basis-even though the actual decision was admittedly based substantially on an im-
permissible factor. 429 U.S. at 287; see Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439
U.S. 410, 417 (1979) (directing lower court to apply Mt. Healthy even though it found
impermissible reason was primary factor in removal decision).
58. The appropriate criminal procedure analogy is not to the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional taint, but rather to the harmless-error doctrine. Under the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional taint, the evidence received by the jury is not tainted despite the prior com-
mission of illegal acts by the government, so long as none of the information was obtained
directly or derivatively from those acts. The harmless-error doctrine provides that even
though the decisionmaker did receive illegal evidence or instructions, the conviction will
not be disturbed if that information did not play a substantial role in the decision.
In Mt. Healthy situations, once the plaintiff has shown that the decisionmaking in-
volved illicit factors, the doctrine of unconstitutional taint is inapplicable. Moreover, the
decision cannot be upheld as harmless error because the employee already has shown
that the illicit consideration was a substantial factor in the decision.
59. 429 U.S. at 285-86.
385
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 376, 1979
nothing." 60 Although the potential for plaintiff windfalls would in-
deed be greater under a substantial-cause test, the Court exaggerated
the remedial problems involved in reinstatement cases and failed to
weigh the countervailing interests of ensuring administrative account-
ability and of preventing a chilling effect on other employees' speech.
The Court focused the windfall discussion on the "long-term con-
sequences of an award of tenure.""' Tenure, of course, is an extreme
example of the windfall problem; other employment remedies entail
far less permanent consequences. Even tenure, however, does not in-
volve the long-term consequences typical of true windfalls. Unlike the
paradigmatic windfall-an excessive monetary award for personal in-
juries62-the award in reinstatement cases is limited in extent and is
not permanent. 63 Other kinds of specific performance can be far more
momentous than a judicial grant of tenure.
6 4
By the Court's reasoning, moreover, any award for violation of rights
could be deemed a windfall. Yet such awards usually are permitted
without any requirement comparable to the Mt. Healthy test: con-
victions are overturned because of constitutional violations even
though the defendant is guilty6 5 and bargaining orders are issued be-
cause of unfair labor practices even though the union would have lost
60. Id. at 285.
61. Id. at 286.
62. See F. Jmms 9: G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.21, at 322, 325 (2d ed. 1977)
(recognizing jury's wide discretion in setting damages for personal injuries).
63. A tenured or nonprobationary employee is not irremovable; he is simply entitled
to procedural rights and a showing of just cause for his removal. See notes 16 9- 17 supra.
64. The Court has not refused to vindicate constitutional rights because of the long-
term consequences of specific performance remedies. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973) (permitting court orders for districtwide remedies to rest on findings
of intentional discrimination in only part of the district); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964) (upholding court-ordered legislative reapportionment). When the costs of granting
specific performance are great, however, the Court has been unwilling to order such a
remedy if there were valid grounds for the action. For example, in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), decided the same day as
Mt. Healthy, the Court noted that had the plaintiffs demonstrated that racial discrimina-
tion was a substantial factor in the village's decision not to rezone a certain area, the
village would have been entitled to a Mt. Healthy rebuttal, that is, a chance to show that
it would have reached the same decision for legitimate reasons. Id. at 270-71 n.21. The
long-term consequences of rezoning are much more permanent, and entail a much greater
dislocation, than granting tenure to a single employee. Thus, although potential wind-
falls exist in establishing a higher threshold for dismissal of public employees, the cost
to the government is not so great that it should entirely escape liability for a substantial
infringement of a constitutional right.
65. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (reversing conviction even
though involuntary confession was completely unnecessary); Bollenbach v. United States,
326 U.S. 607 (1946) (reversing conviction because jury instruction contained unconstitu-
tional presumption, even though evidence was ample to sustain verdict without presump-
tion).
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the election anyway o6 The purpose of such awards is not simply to
compensate the particular victim, but also to deter other abuses of the
constitutional or statutory right. 7 The same reasoning should apply to
unconstitutional removals from public employment.
The Mt. Healthy Court also feared that an employee who suspected
that he would not be rehired or granted tenure might engage in con-
tentious speech in hopes of provoking the employer to remove him on
that ground.68 That concern fails to recognize that protected speech
does not lose that protection simply because of the speaker's motives.6 9
If the speech is protected, the employer is not permitted to remove the
employee no matter how much the speech may annoy him.7 0 The
but-for test thus cannot be justified on the basis of preventing plaintiff
windfalls.
B. The Defects of But-For Causation
The but-for test of Mt. Healthy is inherently inappropriate in the
employee-removal context. The term "but-for" can have either of two
meanings. A but-for cause can be one that was a necessary component
of the particular injurious event. It also can signify the absence of an
66. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15 (1969) (bargaining order
proper remedy for unfair labor practices that made fair election unlikely); Seeler v.
Trading Port, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 40 (2d Cir. 1975) (interim bargaining ordered even though
union lost election 25 to 3).
67. The Court confronted the countervailing interests of avoiding windfalls and in-
sisting on governmental integrity when it extended the exclusionary rule to state criminal
proceedings. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court recognized the objection,
voiced by Judge Cardozo, that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered." Id. at 659 (quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926)).
The Court's reply to Judge Cardozo effectively answers its fears in Mt. Healthy: "The
criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard
of the charter of its own existence." 367 U.S. at 659.
68. 429 U.S. at 286.
69. Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("The
protection of the First Amendment does not depend on 'motivation' "); cf. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent worth of the speech
in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
the source, whether corporation, association, union or individual."). Motive is a con-
sideration in determining whether an employee's speech is libelous and hence unpro-
tected under the Pickering analysis. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74
(1968). If the speech passes Pickering, motive should not reenter as a basis for not
vindicating the exercise of a First Amendment right.
70. The Pickering test will already have taken into account disruption of the employ-
ment relationship. See note 45 supra. Moreover, disruption may not always be a sufficient
ground for denying First Amendment protection to employee speech. See Porter v. Cali-
fano, 592 F.2d 770, 773-74 (5th Cir. 1979) (discounting disruption caused by employee's
exposure of corruption within her department).
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alternative cause for the plaintiff's injury.71 Although the Court used
the term in the latter sense,7 2 commentators have read both types of
but-for causation into the Mt. Healthy test.
7 3
1. But-For as the Absence of an Alternative Cause
The Court's use of but-for to signify the absence of an alternative
cause for the removal is less defensible than the interpretation of but-
for as signifying a necessary component. Courts and commentators
have discussed alternative causation in two general contexts: (1) where
there is an independent cause operating prior to,7
4 simultaneously
with,75 or subsequent to76 the cause in question that would have in-
jured the plaintiff even without the litigated cause; and (2) where the
defendant has breached his duty to the plaintiff, yet the defendant's
conduct would have injured the plaintiff (or would have failed to
71. The following example illustrates the distinction in the removal context. An
employer has a strict rule of "three strikes and you're out." He counts an employee's
protected activity as a strike against him; the employee already had two strikes and is
fired. The employee's protected activity is thus a necessary component in the cause that
brought about his removal. Immediately after the employer's decision, the mayor decides
that no nontenured employees will be renewed because of budget problems. Thus, con-
sideration of the employee's protected activity is not the only way in which the result at
issue-his removal-could have been effected; it would have occurred regardless of the
protected activity being counted against him. Consideration of the employee's protected
conduct is therefore a but-for cause (a necessary component) yet is not a but-for cause
(no alternative cause). See generally H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 225-29
(1959) (discussing doctrine of alternative cause and its comparative law analogues).
72. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977)
(rejecting "rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct played a
part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire" in favor of rule denying
reinstatement if employer "would have reached [the same] decision had not the constitu-
tionally protected incident" occurred) (emphasis in original).
73. Compare Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 450 n.13 (test is one of alternative cause)
with DuRoss, Toward Rationality in Discriminatory Discharge Cases: The Impact of Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle upon the NLRA, 66 Geo. L.J. 1109, 1113 (1978)
(test is one of necessary component).
74. E.g., Pieczonka v. Pullman Co., 89 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1937) (decedent's silicosis
existed prior to wrongful exposure to industrial dust); Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec.
Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932) (decedent electrocuted by wires while falling from
bridge).
75. Compare Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. 9: S. Ste. M. Ry., 98 Wis. 624, 74 N.W. 561
(1898) (no liability where two fires-one wrongful in origin, other innocent-combine to
destroy property) with Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430,
179 N.W. 45 (1920) (opposite holding on same facts) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 432, Comment d, Illustration 4 (1965) (approving Anderson result).
76. E.g., Douglas, Burt & Buchanan Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 150 La. 1038, 91 So.
503 (1922) (though unlawfully maintained bridge blocked barge, downstream bridge
would have blocked passage anyway); Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp.,
70 Wis. 2d 336, 234 N.W.2d 332 (1975) (disabling stroke after injuries induced by de-
fendant).
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prevent or cure the injury) even if it had been proper.77 The second is
not a true case of alternative causation, but rather a test of whether
the defendant's breach was a necessary component in the injurious
event.7 8 Despite uncertainty whether the existence of an alternative
cause should absolve the defendant of all liability,79 even those cases
that rule for the defendant do not support the alternative-cause argu-
ment propounded by the Mt. Healthy Court. The alternative causes
recognized in such cases differ from the alternative cause in Mt.
Healthy with respect to the probability of the second cause occurring
and the independence of the second cause.
In the alternative-cause cases, the occurrence of the second cause is
virtually certain.8 0 In Mt. Healthy situations, on the other hand, the
second administrative decision-removing the employee on permissible
grounds-is entirely hypothetical. Even if the Mt. Healthy Court's view
of the remedial question is proper, the law of torts does not permit
recovery to be defeated by the assertion of speculative alternative
causes.8 '
77. The typical case involves a vehicle that was exceeding the speed limit when it hit
the plaintiff. The causation question is whether, even if he had not been speeding, the
defendant would have injured the plaintiff-that is, whether the excessive speed was a
necessary component in the injurious event. See, e.g., Underwood v. Fultz, 331 P.2d 375,
378 (Okla. 1958) (excessive speed not necessary component of automobile hitting child);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1967) (train's excessive speed not
necessary component). See generally Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in
Negligence Law, 52 CALIF. L. RaV. 459 (1964) (discussing "darting-out cases," in which
children are hit by speeding cars). For other situations in which the question of necessary
component is decided by means of putting a hypothetical case, see, e.g., New York Central
R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920) (negligent failure to equip barge
with life preserver not necessary component in drowning); Cole v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,
149 Kan. 25, 36-37, 86 P.2d 740, 747 (1939) (obstructions of watercourse not necessary
component of flood-damaged crops).
78. Necessary component goes to the question of whether there was a sufficient causal
relationship between the breach and the injury to give rise to liability. Alternative cause
assumes a sufficient causal relationship between breach and injury and goes to the ques-
tion of damages. See H. HART & A. HoNoRE, supra note 71, at 228-29 (distinguishing
"genuine cases of alternative causation from cases where the wrongful aspect of defendant's
act is causally irrelevar~t").
79. Compare Douglas, Burt & Buchanan Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 150 La. 1038, 91
So. 503 (1922) (no liability for lost profits because downstream bridge would have blocked
passage anyway) with Navigazione Libera Triestina Societa Anonima v. Newtown Creek
Towing Co., 98 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1938) (respondent fully liable for cost of painting
ship bottom even though painting would have been necessary within one to four
months).
80. See notes 74-76 supra; cf. Cohn, Note, 86 LAw Q. Rav. 449, 452 (1970) (in German
courts, "reserve cause" can be used to diminish damage award "only if it is wholly
certain that it would have been operative in any event").
81. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86
(1977). The Court has stated elsewhere that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), under which public
employees can sue for reinstatement, was intended to create "a species of tort liability"
in favor of persons who are deprived of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured" to
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The second prerequisite for an alternative-cause defense is the in-
dependence of the second cause. In no case has a defendant been
permitted to argue that had he not injured the plaintiff wrongfully, he
would have injured him innocently.8 2 In Mt. Healthy situations, how-
ever, it is precisely some other hypothetical act of his own that the de-
fendant offers- as the alternative cause. In order to prevent administra-
tive caprice, the defendant should be estopped from making such a
defense.
2. But-For as a Necessary Component
If the but-for test is rejected in the sense intended by the Mt.
Healthy Court, it should not be resurrected with the meaning of
"necessary component." That construction of but-for is wholly in-
adequate. Analytically, but-for works as a universal affirmative test of
causation but fails as a universal negative test.83 If plaintiff shows that
defendant's breach was a but-for cause of his injury, plaintiff should
win.84 If plaintiff cannot show that defendant's breach was a but-for
cause, however, plaintiff should not necessarily lose.85 Commentators
have thus preferred the term "substantial" to "but for."86 Though
them by the Constitution. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976); see Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978) (damage awards under § 1983 governed by principle
of compensation). Some commentators have criticized deriving a remedial approach to
§ 1983 from the law of torts. See, e.g., Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of
Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 10-11 (1974). Professor Yudof has argued that if a tort
analogy is proper in § 1983 actions, it should be an analogy to remedies for "dignitary
torts," which are not limited to pecuniary injury. Yudof, Liability for Constitutional
Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1322, 1380 (1976). Even
if monetary damages are governed by principles of tort liability, it does not follow that
suits for reinstatement should be so analyzed. Traditionally, an equitable remedy-such
as reinstatement-was proper precisely because the legal remedy was inadequate.
82. That claim is distinct from a defendant's argument that his breach was causally
irrelevant. See notes 77-78 supra. A person who fails to take some preventive or curative
measure is not liable if the independent, actively injurious force is so powerful that even
the correct preventive or curative measures would have been of no avail. See, e.g., New
York Central R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 33,5 (2d Cir. 1920) (failure to provide
life preservers as preventive measure); Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242
(1938) (surgeon's failure to take proper curative measures). In those cases the defendant
does not appeal to another act of his own as the active cause of the injury.
83. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. Rxv. 941, 948 (1935).
84. This assumes, of course, that defendant's breach was sufficiently proximate.
85. If three men of equal strength push a car over a cliff, and the force of only two
is necessary to accomplish the feat, each man can correctly claim that he is not a but-for
cause of the car's damage. Carpenter, supra note 83, at 948.
86. See, e.g., L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 180-85 (1927); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF TORTS 238-41 (4th ed. 1971); Carpenter, supra note 83, at 952 (preferring
"material factor" to "but for"). Hart and Honor6 deprecate the substantial factor test,
however, because it is "vague" and because "the jury must rely on intuition to apply it."
H. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 71, at 263-68. Professor Green has responded that the
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"substantial" does not signify a level of importance noticeably lower
than "but for,"'8 7 it avoids pro-defendant speculation as to whether a
significant or appreciable factor amounts to a necessary component.
3. The In Terrorem Effect
The most serious defect of the Mt. Healthy test is that it exacerbates
the chilling effect 8 of reprisals on public employees exercising First
Amendment rights.8 9 Although the notion of chilling effects was
developed in the context of overbroad legislation,"0 an administrative
decision can create as objectionable a chilling effect as any statute.91
Indeed, several features of administrative action may make it even
more chilling than a statute.9 2 An employee fearful of repressive ad-
test is no more vague or intuitive than the "reasonableness" standard, which is con-
sidered a proper term in which to couch jury questions. Green, The Causal Relation
Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543, 554 (1962).
87. "Substantial" has been glossed in terms of "significant," W. PROSSER, supra note
86, at 240 n.29, and "appreciable," L. GREEN, supra note 86, at 185.
"Partial cause," or "even a partial cause," does signify a lower level of importance. In
the analogous area of labor law, however, a number of circuits order reinstatement on
this rather weak causal relation. See note 103 infra.
88. The phrase "chilling effect" is derived from Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
89. The chill doctrine recognizes the tendency of individuals to steer clear of activity
proscribed by the government. Even if the activity in which they wish to engage might
fall outside the area clearly covered by the statute, or even if a statute that does cover
the activity has gone unenforced, persons will tend to avoid that activity. NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("The threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions."). When the proposed activity is protected
by the First Amendment, such avoidance has been held to be an unacceptable cost of
governmental control and regulation. Id.
90. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (invalidating law
prohibiting member of Communist organization from using passport with "knowledge or
notice" that registration order had become final); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(invalidating law requiring teacher to list every organization with which he was affiliated
over five-year period). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
L.iW 1132-42 (9th ed. 1975) (discussing attractiveness and curtailment of overbreadth
technique); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rey. 844
(1970).
91. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967) (recognizing
chilling effect of "intricate administrative machinery"); Adcock v. Board of Educ., 10
Cal. 3d 60, 66, 513 P.2d 900, 904, 109 Cal. Rptr. 676, 680 (1973) (en banc) (recognizing
chilling effect of transfer).
The factors that inhibit violation of the unconstitutional features of an overbroad
statute are present in the employment context: respect for authority, uncertainty as to
whether the activity will be held protected, fear of government sanctions, and general
unwillingness to bear the burden of litigation. See Note, supra note 90, at 854-55 (factors
inhibiting challenge of overbroad statute).
92. A person who fears that an overbroad statute will be invoked against him knows
that the government will have to take the initiative, specify the acts for which he is
being prosecuted, and prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. If he is convinced that
the activity is protected by the First Amendment, the person can expect ultimate vindica-
tion despite the statutory prohibition. See T. EMERsoN, supra note 39, at 163 (administra-
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ministrative action confronts secrecy and uncertainty at all stages of
employment.9 3 Even when an employee is entitled to due process pro-
tection, the requirements are rudimentary and administrative discre-
tion is practically unconstrained. 94 Moreover, the public employee
labors under great uncertainty as to the scope of his First Amendment
rights.95 The typical chill produced by an overbroad statute is thus
aggravated in the administrative context by the higher degree of sub-
stantive uncertainty and the secrecy surrounding personnel decisions,
as well as the difficulties of proving institutional motive,96 and the
plaintiff's burden of going forward.
97
When an employee challenges an allegedly impermissible dismissal,
he protects not only his own rights but the rights of other employees as
well. If the removed employee loses after carrying his burden of proof,
then other employees-who on the Mt. Healthy Court's assumption are
"marginal"9 8-will be forced to calculate whether reprisals for their
exercise of similar First Amendment rights would amount to a but-for
cause of their removal. Because of uncertainty as to the future actions
of an employer, these other employees may well adopt a cautious
posture and not exercise their full First Amendment rights. The
Court's adoption of the tort-law principle of limiting the remedy to
the plaintiff's actual injury fails to recognize the plaintiff's representa-
tion of these other employees' First Amendment interests.
tive system may be "much tighter, more pervasive form of restriction" than criminal
system). But see Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2319 n.6
(1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("criminal sanctions discourage speech much more power-
fully than do administrative regulations").
93. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (noting that school administrators
"can terminate the teacher's employment without bringing charges, without notice, with-
out a hearing, without affording an opportunity to explain"); T. EMERsoN, supra note
39, at 163 ("low visibility" of administrative action results in "imagined impact of restric-
tion" being "most repressive feature of all"). Compare NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (association's bringing suits on behalf of black children despite statutory prohibi-
tion protected) with Abbott v. Thetford, 534 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977) (probation officer's bringing suits on behalf of black children
despite superior's prohibition unprotected).
94. See pp. 378-79 supra (employee's rudimentary procedural protection).
95. In contrast to ordinary citizens, who are encouraged to engage in robust, wide-
open debate, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), public em-
ployees are cautioned against disturbing the authority of supervisors or harmonious rela-
tions among fellow workers, see Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-72 (1968).
It is difficult for an employee to determine in advance whether his actions will so disturb
the workplace that they will be unprotected.
96. See Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative" Intent and the De
Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 322-26 (1976) (examining difficulties of de-
termining institutional intent).
97. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (recognizing chilling effect of bear-
ing burden of proof on exercise of First Amendment rights).
98. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977).
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The Mt. Healthy test, then, should be rejected as ill-founded and
unsound. The criminal procedure analogy simply collapses under scru-
tiny. The Court's concern with plaintiff windfalls is exaggerated. More
important, the basic appeal to alternative causation is without logic
or foundation in precedent. The test contravenes the policies of con-
straining governmental decisionmaking within constitutional bounds
and of minimizing chilling effects on the exercise of First Amendment
rights.
III. The Substantial-Cause Test
The Court should replace the but-for test with a simple substantial-
cause test. Under that test, the plaintiff would continue to bear the
burden of proving that his exercise of First Amendment rights was a
substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision to remove
him. If he carried that burden, however, the employee would win out-
right. The employer would have no opportunity to claim that although
he actually removed the employee for impermissible reasons, the em-
ployee would have been removed even though he had not engaged in
the protected activity. The standard of "substantial or motivating
factor" would focus a court's attention on the actual decision to remove
the employee, asking whether constitutionally improper considerations
played a significant, important, or appreciable part in the decision. It
would discourage pro-defendant speculation on conjectural alternative
causes.
A. Justifications for the Substantial-Cause Test
Unlike the Mt. Healthy test, the substantial-cause test would accord
with the theory of causation that governs the law of torts. In tort law, a
defendant is liable whenever his breach has been found to be a sub-
stantial, significant, or appreciable factor in causing the plaintiff's
injury.9
0
Moreover, in public-employee reinstatement cases, two special factors
urge that doubts about the importance of a defendant's breach be
resolved in favor of the plaintiff. The first is the chilling effect that an
99. See notes 86-87 supra. In rare cases, defendant's liability may be reduced if he can
show the certain existence of an independent innocent cause whose certain or highly
probable effect is injury to the plaintiff. See notes 74-76 supra. The alternatively caused
injury depreciates the value of that interest of the plaintiff that the defendant has wrong-
fully injured. Such an anomalous situation will arise no more frequently in impermissible
removal cases than it does in tort law generally. Mt. Healthy itself certainly did not
present such a situation.
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administrative decision substantially motivated by a desire to penalize
protected speech will have on other employees' exercise of First Amend-
ment rights.100 The second is the tainting effect that an employer's
hostility to the employee's protected activity can have on his considera-
tion of other, legitimate factors.' 0 ' When the employee's protected
speech has been a substantial factor in his removal, the likelihood that
legitimate considerations have been tainted is far greater than if the
protected speech was merely a partial cause in the administrative
decision.' 0 2 As a less pro-defendant standard than the but-for test, sub-
stantial-cause is necessary to minimize chill and taint.
A substantial-cause theory also would conform to the case law govern-
ing the analogous area of discriminatory discharge under the National
Labor Relations Act. Courts do not recognize a theory of alternative
causation in labor law cases and some courts order reinstatement using
only a partial-cause standard.
0 3
Furthermore, a substantial-cause test would emphasize the constitu-
tional bounds on discretionary administrative decisionmaking by focus-
ing on the actual decision that infringed an employee's rights, instead
of disregarding an unconstitutional decision on the basis of a conjec-
tural event. Such a result-oriented constraint on governmental decision-
making is required in an area in which procedural safeguards have
been withheld in order to conserve fiscal and administrative re-
sources.' 0 4 The more discretion that is granted decisionmakers, the less
its abuse should be countenanced.
100. See pp. 391-92 supra (discussing chill).
101. It is more likely that conflicts will arise between an outspoken employee and his
supervisors or coworkers; his deficiencies will appear more glaring to a superior watching
with the eyes of an adversary.
102. The disruptiveness of the employee's speech has already been counted against him
in the Pickering calculus, see note 45 supra, and resolved in his favor. It should not
reenter the calculation as unrecognized taint.
103. In adjudicating labor law cases, only the First Circuit requires a but-for standard
of proof before reinstating the employee. See Coletti's Furniture, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d
1292, 1293 (1st Cir. 1977) (after Mt. Healthy, NLRB must use First Circuit's "dominant
motive" rule); DuRoss, supra note 73, at 1112-13 (Mt. Healthy supports adoption of First
Circuit test in labor law). The other circuits require a substantial-factor or a partial-cause
standard. See, e.g., Betts Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1967) (violation
if union activity "but a partial motive"); NLRB v. Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (7th
Cir. 1964) (violation unless discharge "predicated solely" on valid ground); DuRoss, supra
note 73, at 1111-12 n.16 (collecting cases). There is no sound basis for contending that the
protection given to the First Amendment should be weaker than that afforded statutory
labor rights. The courts are to examine alleged violations of First Amendment rights with
"closest scrutiny." See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
But see Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1245, 1265 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry,
J., concurring) (NLRA strikes legislative balance more favorable to employees than does
Mt. Healthy test in First Amendment area).
104. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-18 (1976) (recognizing consideration of
conserving fiscal and administrative resources).
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Justification of the substantial-cause test thus rests on its ability to
minimize taint and chill, on its consistency with related areas of law,
and on its emphasis on constitutional restraints for discretionary ad-
ministrative decisionmaking.
B. Shortcomings
The substantial-cause test might be criticized from two directions:
as going too far, and as not going far enough.
1. Pro-Defendant Objections
Those who believe that the test would go too far could lodge three
principal objections: that judicial invalidation of governmental action
on the basis of motivation is improper; that the substantial-cause test
would aggravate employee goading of employers; and that the test
would excessively involve federal courts in personnel decisions. 10 5
The major problems with invalidating governmental action on the
basis of motivation are ascertainability, futility, and disutility. 00 Al-
though these objections may be powerful with respect to legislation,
they do not present insurmountable difficulties with respect to ad-
ministrative action. It usually will be impossible for a court to ascertain
the motives of the scores, or even hundreds, of legislators who pass a
piece of legislation.10 7 Even if this evidentiary obstacle is overcome,
overturning such legislation may be futile because an identical statute
could be passed with a purified legislative history.'08 Furthermore, it
may be unprofitable to strike down legislation that is "laudable in
operational terms" simply because it was improperly motivated. 0 9
These concerns are less telling in reviewing administrative action.
105. All three of these objections also could be lodged against the "but-for" test. The
specific objection against the substantial-cause test is that it aggravates each of these
difficulties.
106. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970). Although these objections bear against the but-for test
because it too is based on motivation, they bear more heavily against the substantial-cause
test. As a more pro-defendant test, but-for may be viewed as a judicial response to the
difficulties raised by ascertainability, futility, and disutility. The following analysis argues
that in an administrative context these considerations are not so weighty that a but-for
test is required.
107. See id. at 1285; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 217 (1962).
108. See A. BICKEL, supra note 107, at 216; Ely, supra note 106, at 1214-15. The courts
cannot impose procedural requirements on the legislature, and the Congress, at least, is
protected by the speech or debate clause from having its members explain their motives
for legislative acts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see Note, Evidentiary Implications of the
Speech or Debate Clause, 88 YALE L.J. 1280, 1286-87 n.30 (1979) (clause protects sensitive
legislative compromises).
109. Ely, supra note 106, at 1215.
395
The Yale Law Journal
First, it is far easier to determine the motivation of a few administrators
in a quasi-judicial action such as a personnel decision than to ascertain
the motivation of perhaps hundreds of legislators. Second, it is proper
for courts to impose mandatory procedures on administrative bodies
whereas they can not impose procedural requirements on legislatures.
If reinstatement appears to be a futile remedy because the employer
will merely remove the employee a second time, the courts can demand
that the initial burden be on the employer in the second removal to
show by substantial evidence or by clear and convincing evidence that
it has legitimate reasons for removing the employee.1 Finally, al-
though there may be disutility in invalidating a governmental action
that is "laudable in operational terms" because it was improperly
motivated, the chilling effect on other employees' speech caused by an
unconstitutionally motivated removal makes any utility calculus prob-
lematic.
The answer to the second objection, concerning employee goading,"'
has already been suggested: an activity does not lose its constitutional
protection because of the actor's motives.1 2 Extreme forms of goading
by an employee will not pass the balancing test established by the
Court in Pickering v. Board of Education;13 if the activity survives
Pickering, an employer who has effected an unconstitutional removal
should not be given a second chance.1
4
The third objection, that the substantial-cause test could injure
federalism and aggravate the caseload of the federal courts," 5 also fails:
110. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 126 (suggesting that courts "enjoin an ad-
ministrative decisionmaker from making the same decision again unless he comes forward
with persuasive evidence that this time it will be made only for legitimate reasons").
111. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977);
see p. 387 suPra.
112. See p. 387 supra.
113. 391 U.S. 563, 568-72 (1968); see note 45 supra; cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) (when "private expression" at stake, additional
factors enter Pickering calculus).
114. The employer remains free after the reinstatement to make determinations of
the employee's professional qualifications. See Ofsevit v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ. and
Colleges, 21 Cal. 3d 763, 776 n.13, 582 P.2d 88, 95 n.13, 148 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 n.13 (1978)
(en banc) (reinstating university lecturer).
115. In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), the Court appealed both to federalism
and to its high caseload to justify judicial restraint. With respect to caseload, the Court
stated: "The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude
of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies." Id. at 349. The federalism
point was more explicit: "the ultimate control of state personnel relationships is, and
will remain, with the States; they may grant or withhold tenure at their unfettered dis-
cretion." Id. at 349-50 n.14.
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the states are not permitted to evade the First Amendment by invok-
ing federalism." 16 Moreover, local autonomy is fostered by the weaker
substantive constraints and the minimal procedural constraints placed
on government as an employer." 7 Overload of the federal courts should
be dealt with by means other than discouraging the vindication of
constitutional rights.
2. Pro-Plaintiff Objections
Those who believe that the substantial-cause test would not go far
enough might argue that a focus on the actual decision would simply
encourage employers to be more devious in removing outspoken em-
ployees. That danger may be exaggerated because the employer would
have to have some legitimate reason for removal. An employer would
have difficulty contriving such a reason where his disfavor with the
employee arose shortly after the employee's exercise of protected speech.
If employer deception were to become a serious impediment to ap-
plication of the substantial-cause test, one solution might be to require
the employer to provide even nontenured or probationary employees
with reasons for their removal.118 Although that requirement would
not preclude an employer from giving false reasons," 9 the employee
would have a better indication whether the employer's reasons were
plausible. The existence of such a concrete explanation would facilitate
rebuttal by employees who believed that the reasons were spurious.
Moreover, it would be a small step to require a statement of reasons at
the time of removal because the employer already is required to provide
reasons after an employee sues for reinstatement. Such a requirement
would not diminish the immense range of legitimate reasons for which
116. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (First Amendment applies to states
through Fourteenth); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (same). No more than a
small minority of the Supreme Court has ever maintained that First Amendment pro-
tection is to any degree diminished in passing to the states through the medium of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For the minority view, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287-95 (1952) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
117. See pp. 378-82 supra.
118. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(statement of reasons should be required when public employment not renewed); K.
DAvis, supra note 4, at 103-06 (written reasons and findings especially important in discre-
tionary determinations).
119. See K. DAvis, supra note 4, at 106 (difficult to prevent substitution of "ready-
made boiler plate" for statement of motivating reasons, but "nearly all administrators
most of the time take the requirement [of reasons and findings] seriously").
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an employer may remove an employee, nor would its fiscal or ad-
ministrative burden be significant.120
Thus without unacceptably constricting administrative discretion,
the substantial-cause test would reduce its constitutionally impermis-
sible costs. Such a test for determining the permissibility of government
personnel decisions is superior to the current Mt. Healthy but-for test
because it weighs the constitutional values at stake in removals more
sensitively and perceives more realistically the balance of power be-
tween government employers and employees.
120. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("not burdensome to give reasons when reasons exist"); K. DAvis, suPra note 4, at 104-05
(use of written reasons by Immigration Service, though initially considered impractical,
required no increase in staff).
